Context: President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Southeast Asia (April 14–18, 2025)

• Countries visited: Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia.
  
  
• Objective: To present China as the “reliable partner of choice” in Southeast Asia.
  
  
• Background: Comes amid a 145% U.S. tariff on Chinese exports, initiated under the Trump administration.
  
  
• Broader goal: Recalibrating China’s external economic engagement, especially in regions where it has geostrategic proximity and economic receptivity.
  
  

2. Not Just Routine Diplomacy

• The visit was part of a deliberate strategy to:
  
  
  • Reduce dependence on Western markets.
    
    
  • Boost stability and leadership in the Indo-Pacific.
    
    
  • Address economic pressure and enhance regional cooperation.
    
    
• Coincided with the “Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighbouring Countries”, highlighting the importance of regional diplomacy.
  
  

3. Southeast Asia as a Buffer and Bridge

• Why Southeast Asia?
  
  
  • Acts as a buffer to shield China from Western economic pressure.
    
    
  • Serves as a bridge to diversify trade and economic ties.
    
    
• Examples of tariff impact:
  
  
  • Cambodia may face a 59% tariff (10% universal + additional 49%).
    
    
  • Vietnam: 46% tariff.
    
    
  • Malaysia: 24% tariff.
    
    
• China’s response:
  
  
  • Pitched multilateralism and opposition to unilateralism.
    
    
  • Promoted economic resilience and technology independence.
    
    

4. Strengthening Bilateral Economic Ties

• Vietnam: Signed 45 cooperation agreements.
  
  
• Cambodia: Over 30 agreements covering:
  
  
  • Digital economy
    
    
  • Artificial intelligence
    
    
  • Smart agriculture
    
    
  • Infrastructure
    
    
  • Cambodia’s trade volume with China expected to exceed $15 billion in 2024.
    
    
  • Funan Techo Canal project = showcase of China’s public goods model.
    
    

5. To Project a Contrast to the U.S.

• China portrays itself as:
  
  
  • A non-coercive, rule-setting leader.
    
    
  • Opposed to the S. model of conditional aid, intervention, and military alliances.
    
    
• In contrast to U.S.-backed groupings like:
  
  
  • AUKUS, QUAD, Bilateral alliances.
    
    
  • Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), criticized for lacking trade incentives.
    
    

6. Emphasis on Regional Norm-Setting

• China’s soft power strategy focuses on:
  
  
  • Norms of non-interference.
    
    
  • Cultural linkages (e.g., BRI, Confucius Institutes).
    
    
  • Alternative to the U.S.’s liberal international order.
    
    
• China appeals to Southeast Asian countries that have been cautious of Western influence but also wary of becoming too dependent on China.
  
  

7. The Larger Strategic Picture

• Strategic Positioning:
  
  
  • Presents China as an indispensable economic partner.
    
    
  • Counterbalances U.S. decoupling and containment strategies.
    
    
  • Ensures Southeast Asia is less susceptible to Western influence.
    
    
• Challenges for the U.S.:
  
  
  • Harder to isolate China economically.
    
    
  • Difficulty in operationalizing a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy.
    
    

8. Signalling to Global and Domestic Audiences

• Domestic signalling: Shows the Chinese public that:
  
  
  • China is not isolated.
    
    
  • It has alternatives amidst economic pressures and geopolitical tension.
    
    
• Global signalling:
  
  
  • China continues to engage diplomatically and economically.
    
    
  • Reiterates its commitment to multilateralism and peaceful engagement.
    
    
• Use of:
  
  
  • Warm receptions, economic deals, and joint statements.
    
    
  • Diplomatic overtures to shape narratives.
    
    

9. Takeaway

• Xi’s tour is strategically timed to:
  
  
  • Reinforce China’s leadership in the Indo-Pacific.
    
    
  • Push back against the U.S.-led narrative of economic isolation.
    
    
  • Entrench China’s influence through economic statecraft and normative diplomacy.
    
    

Outcome uncertain: Depends on how receptive regional states are to China’s overtures amid underlying concerns.